Épisodes

  • To Beat China’s Navy to the Punch, Defend Forward in Taiwan
    Feb 11 2025

    The US is falling behind China in naval power, making conventional deterrence strategies for Taiwan ineffective. In this episode, we explore an alternative military approach—one that sidesteps China's naval dominance and strengthens deterrence through irregular warfare and strategic presence. Tune in to understand why a new US military strategy for Taiwan is critical for maintaining regional stability.

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    13 min
  • Lessons from the Frontlines: Ukrainian SEAD Operations and Their Implications for Western Special Operations Forces
    Feb 6 2025

    In this episode, we explore Ukrainian SEAD operations and their impact on modern warfare. Learn how Ukrainian special operations forces have successfully targeted Russian air defenses and what this means for the future of U.S. and NATO SOF. Tune in for an in-depth analysis of tactics, strategies, and lessons from the frontlines.

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    16 min
  • Dominating Conflict’s Leading Edge: Five Principles for an Assertive Irregular Warfare Doctrine
    Feb 4 2025

    In today’s episode, we delve deep into the complexities of irregular warfare in the modern geopolitical landscape. With global tensions on the rise, from the Syrian conflict to the shifting power dynamics in Ukraine and beyond, this episode explores the need for an adaptive and layered U.S. strategy to navigate the "gray zone" of conflict. From proxy deterrence and economic warfare to combating disinformation, we unpack the principles that can empower U.S. policy and defense efforts without escalating into full-blown war. Join us as we explore the evolving challenges and the strategic responses needed to safeguard global stability.

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    12 min
  • Enhancing USSOF Capacity to Foster Resistance: Aligning Authorities and Resources to Win the Gray Zone
    Jan 30 2025

    n this episode, we dive into the evolving role of U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) in Irregular Warfare (IW) and their growing impact on gray zone conflicts. USSOF’s adaptability, specialized skills, and focus on building resilient partnerships have made them pivotal in shaping regions and preempting threats—especially in conflicts like the ongoing war in Ukraine.

    We explore how USSOF has been crucial in fostering resistance movements, from supporting Ukrainian efforts to counter Russian aggression through unconventional tactics, to the structural challenges they face in current U.S. Security Cooperation (SC) mechanisms. These mechanisms, while vital, are insufficient for supporting the expanding scope of USSOF operations. We delve into the shortcomings of existing funding and authority structures, such as Section 127d and the SSCI process, and propose a new, streamlined approach that would ensure USSOF’s continued agility and strategic success.

    Join us as we analyze the intersection of policy, military strategy, and operational needs, and discuss how refining U.S. support for resistance-focused operations can enhance national security and global stability.

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    13 min
  • How to Counter Russian Occupation: Building Multinational Resistance Networks Before a Crisis
    Jan 28 2025

    In this episode, we delve into the historical and modern strategies for countering Russian occupation. From the guerrilla tactics of the Forest Brothers to lessons drawn from Ukraine's resistance, discover how multinational cooperation, emerging technologies, and pre-crisis planning can strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. Learn why resilience, innovation, and unity are critical to resisting occupation and safeguarding sovereignty in the face of aggression.

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    14 min
  • The Necessary Evolution of U.S. Grand Strategy: Learning from the Past to Address Modern Challenges in the Era of Strategic Competition
    Jan 23 2025
    The Necessary Evolution of U.S. Grand Strategy: Learning from the Past to Address Modern Challenges in the Era of Strategic Competition by Doug Livermore In an era of increasing global complexity and competition, the United States faces unprecedented challenges that require a fundamental reassessment of its grand strategy. As defined by Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the role of grand strategy is, “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.” Examining historical approaches to national security should inform contemporary strategic thinking, all while acknowledging that modern threats demand innovative solutions that go beyond traditional frameworks. The transformation of the international system from a unipolar moment following the Cold War to today's multipolar reality necessitates a comprehensive reevaluation of American strategic priorities and approaches. Historical Foundations: The Containment Strategy The Cold War era's containment strategy, first articulated by George Kennan in his 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” and later formalized in National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68), represented a watershed moment in American strategic thinking. This comprehensive approach successfully constrained Soviet expansion through multiple interconnected mechanisms. The strategy established a robust military deterrent through the nascent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other regional alliances, thus creating a credible counter to Soviet military power. Simultaneously, it leveraged economic tools, including the Marshall Plan, to strengthen democratic allies and create a resilient international order. These efforts were complemented by sophisticated diplomatic initiatives to isolate the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact while building a coalition of democratic nations. The success of containment demonstrated the effectiveness of patient, multi-dimensional engagement in achieving long-term strategic objectives. However, it is crucial to note that this success came at significant cost and required sustained commitment across multiple administrations. The strategy's effectiveness stemmed from its ability to align domestic resources, international partnerships, and strategic objectives in a coherent and sustainable manner. This alignment proved essential in maintaining American resolve through periods of intense crisis and relative calm. The containment strategy's success also highlighted the importance of strategic communication in maintaining domestic and international support. Through various initiatives, including the United States Information Agency and Radio Free Europe, America effectively communicated its values and objectives to global audiences while countering Soviet propaganda. This aspect of the strategy provides valuable lessons for today's information environment, where the battle for narrative dominance has become increasingly crucial. The Reagan Doctrine represented both an evolution and intensification of Kennan’s containment strategy, moving beyond mere constraint of Soviet influence to actively rolling back communist expansion through support to anti-communist forces worldwide. This more aggressive approach maintained containment's fundamental recognition of the need to integrate multiple instruments of national power, but significantly expanded America's willingness to provide overt military and economic support to insurgent forces in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Reagan's strategy paired this support for anti-communist proxy forces with a massive conventional military buildup, strengthening of key alliances, and promotion of free trade– demonstrating how discrete tactical actions could serve broader strategic aims. The strategy's success in accelerating the Soviet Union's eventual collapse highlighted several enduring principles of effective grand strategy. First, it showed how supporting local partner forces could achieve strategic objectives at relatively low cost and risk to US forces. Second, it demonstrated the importance of aligning military, economic, and diplomatic efforts – as Reagan's military pressure was amplified by economic warfare and aggressive diplomacy. Third, it revealed how focusing on adversaries’ key vulnerabilities (in this case, the ) could force them to make strategic concessions. These lessons would later influence approaches to counterterrorism and great power competition, though the unique circumstances of the late Cold War meant that not all elements of the Reagan Doctrine would translate directly to future challenges. The Evolution of Political Warfare Modern great power competition has evolved beyond traditional military confrontation into a complex web of political warfare. Kennan's May 1948 memorandum on political warfare ...
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    17 min
  • A New Playbook for Irregular Warfare: How the United States Can Win Without Fighting
    Jan 21 2025
    During the final stretch of the 2024 American presidential election, the Department of Justice seized 32 web domains linked to ‘Doppelganger,’ an aggressive Russian disinformation campaign to influence American voters. Meanwhile, China has continued to exploit the US sanctions regime to promote its own currency, the renminbi, as a viable alternative to the dollar. And while wildfires and winter storms ravage expansive regions of the country—not long after Hurricanes Helene and Milton had exposed glaring deficiencies in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) planning and budget—forecasters and politicians alike grapple with an increasingly grim future defined by extreme weather and climate change. What do these challenges have in common? According to the siloed US national security enterprise, perhaps not much. But that assumption betrays a critical lack of vision. In reality, Americans are under siege every day, often by forces that they neither perceive nor understand. The United States is at war—not kinetically, but instead on the intangible battlefields of internet chat groups, currency exchanges, security cooperation agreements, and natural disaster responses. As the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) warns, the contemporary security environment is best described as an era of strategic competition and transnational crises. And the simultaneity of these challenges will be a defining feature of American foreign and domestic policy in the 21st century. How should the US government conceive of this new “Great Game” in which it is uncomfortably enmeshed? How does one measure a state’s relative position in the ongoing geopolitical clash? And what does ‘winning’ mean in this environment? These questions serve as the primary impetus for Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century—a new book by Rebecca Patterson, Susan Bryant, Ken Gleiman, and Mark Troutman which establishes a holistic vocabulary and strategic framework for outcompeting America’s adversaries. In a modern era of ‘irregular’ challenges that often fall below the traditional threshold of armed conflict, the United States must employ a more expansive toolset of non-kinetic and cost-effective means, drawing upon American advantages and undermining enemy weaknesses. Strategic Drift Today’s threat landscape is daunting. A renewed era of strategic competition—featuring revisionist autocratic actors such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations—is at the forefront of national security concerns. But Winning Without Fighting also adopts the idea, which underpins the 2022 NSS, that the world has entered an “age of crises” or a “world of the polycrisis.” Indeed, the concurrent threats posed by the increasing (and often mutually-reinforcing) effects of climate change, health crises, mass migration, and the introduction of disruptive technologies will challenge the resilience of all national governments, consuming increasing amounts of economic and military power to counter them effectively. Experts may debate whether strategic competition or transnational crises pose the more significant problem, but the United States must manage both. However, America is strategically adrift. The US government, having failed to secure meaningful military success in any recent conflict, has determined the best way to succeed is to double down on preparing for a large-scale conventional operation while neglecting to recognize that its adversaries are already waging an asymmetric war using all instruments of power. As a result, America’s leaders often pursue a narrowly cast military-, technology-, and deterrence-centric strategy—instead of a more appropriate whole-of-society approach leveraging both kinetic and non-kinetic tools of military, economic, and information statecraft, as well as national resilience. At best, this flawed construct inadequately employs the necessary tools of competitive statecraft and produces suboptimal strategic outcomes; at worst, it could precipitate strategic defeat. Strategic Culture This dependence on overwhelming military force is rooted deep in American strategic culture. Relying on the work of Colin Gray and Tom Manhken, Winning Without Fighting argues that American strategic culture suffers from a binary conception of war and peace incompatible with the gray-zone style of competition in which it is currently enmeshed. This binary also extends to the definition of war itself, which Americans conceive of solely as military conflict—in contrast to the more holistic Chinese view of warfare, which also encompasses economic and informational competition, and to Russian strategic culture, which prefers authoritarian governance and strategic depth in the form of a well-controlled near abroad. And while military power remains necessary in a world that features a stalemated ...
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    14 min
  • Assembling the A-Team: Creating an Interagency Office to Counter Irregular Warfare
    Jan 16 2025
    Irregular warfare is a nebulous term that very much resembles the polycephalic hydra of Greek mythology. The manipulation of international law and norms to secure regional hegemony, use of unmarked soldiers and equipment to occupy the territory of another nation, highly violent transnational militia and terror networks, recurring cyberattacks, threats to critical infrastructure, and everything in between fall within the domain of irregular warfare. Ultimately, what binds this near-infinite array of actors is a wish to fight with just enough plausible deniability built into their respective deeds to forestall the escalation of a conflict to the level of traditional conventional or nuclear war, typically involving the use of soldiers, tanks, ships, planes, and nuclear arms to occupy territory or otherwise impose political and material defeat upon an enemy. In essence, irregular warfare consists of just about everything under the sun since it works both separately and in tandem with conventional warfare to achieve desired outcomes. However, separating irregular warfare from conventional warfare perhaps occludes more than it clarifies. The goal of securing influence over other actors—“assur[ing] or coerc[ing] states or other groups,” in the words of the Congressional Research Service—can be seen as the goal of both conventional and irregular warfare as traditional alliance networks and wars are meant to defend friends and repel enemies through any means necessary. For instance, surreptitious cyberattacks aimed at key banks or commercial actors are not much different than the use of formal naval blocks used to curtail a nation’s economic activity. Therefore, it is of great importance to recognize that warfare—whether conventional or irregular—is a continuum requiring management from whole-of-society inputs. Consequently, the United States government should consider the implementation of a new interagency office to coordinate these various inputs while bringing irregular threats into strategic focus. Such a body would not seek to duplicate the efforts of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) or other such entities focused solely on collecting and disseminating governmental intelligence. Rather, this new entity should resemble a more informal version of the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), which was established in 1940 by Franklin Roosevelt’s administration to marry the leadership of governmental agencies (e.g. the Departments of War, Labor, and Agriculture) with that of commercial heavyweights (e.g. the Ford Motor Company or Higgins Industries) to concentrate defense production, stabilize consumer prices, and promote broad innovation. Indeed, as the Second World War effectively demonstrated, everything the American people could muster was necessary for expelling the forces of fascism from both the Atlantic and Pacific. This meant not only recruiting millions of men to fight in uniform, but also recruiting men and women at home to create effective propaganda, to coordinate the production of materiel to support those fighting abroad, to bolster deception, and to generate revenue through things like war bonds to ensure the United States and its allies had the treasure to prosecute a war against tyrants. In other words, there was little distinction between means and ends, warfighter and civilian, as the whole heft of the United States had to be mobilized to ensure victory in two theaters. Likewise, the numerous domains of irregular warfare today require many of the same public-private inputs as those used to fight in the Second World War. Cyber threats require both government bodies and private businesses to protect the data and infrastructure of the American people. The United States Navy must use its advanced warships and munitions to not only compete against other navies, but to protect vital shipping lanes like the Red Sea from disruptions. The American foreign policy apparatus must take staunch positions in forums like the United Nations to ensure strategic competitors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) cannot amend or abuse elements like international maritime law to become the suzerain of a whole region. In this way, there is little distinction between irregular and conventional threats, with many of the same tools used across the board. With that in mind, it’s time to muster a new A-team to assess and respond to irregular threats in a holistic, far-seeing manner. The Department of Defense (DoD) veered close to this idea in miniature when it consolidated several military intelligence elements to form the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS). The formation of the DCS signaled a desire to overcome a degree of myopia imposed by the Global War on Terrorism. Rather than focusing solely on highly localized battlefield intelligence as it had during the start of the post-9/11 wars in Iraq in Afghanistan, the DCS would gather information relevant ...
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    12 min