Military History Strategy

When World War II broke out in Europe, the American army had no specialized division of mountain soldiers. But in the winter of 1939-40, after a tiny band of Finnish mountain troops brought the invading Soviet army to its knees, an amateur skier named Charles Minot “Minnie” Dole convinced the United States Army to let him recruit an extraordinary assortment of European expatriates, wealthy ski bums, mountaineers, and thrill-seekers and form them into a unique band of Alpine soldiers.

On December 8, 1941, just five hours after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese planes attacked a remote US outpost in the westernmost reaches of the Pacific. It was the beginning of an incredible 16-day fight for Wake Island, a tiny but strategically valuable dot in the ocean. Unprepared for the stunning assault, the small battalion was dangerously outnumbered and outgunned. But they compensated with a surplus of bravery and perseverance, waging an extraordinary battle against all odds.

"The Art of War" by Sun Tzu is a monumental work in the field of military strategy that has had a profound impact on future generations. It stands as the pinnacle of military literature worldwide.

Most histories of the US Army in World War II view the Mediterranean Theater of Operations primarily as a deadly training ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on the beaches of Oran, in the hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in the MTO would not have materialized without the leadership of battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops.

What makes the Civil War so fascinating is that it presents an endless number of "what if" scenarios - moments when the outcome of the war (and therefore world history) hinged on a single small mistake or omission. In this audiobook, Civil War historian Edward Bonekemper highlights the 10 biggest Civil War blunders, focusing in on intimate moments of military indecision and inaction involving great generals like Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sherman as well as less effective generals such as George B. McClellan and Benjamin Butler.

Es un tratado sobre el kenjutsu escrito por Miyamoto Musashi en su vejez —durante su retiro de ermitaño en la cueva de Reigandō en 1643— y finalizado el 19 de mayo de 1645, pocas semanas antes de su muerte. El libro está dedicado a su pupilo Terao Magonojo. Se considera un tratado clásico sobre la estrategia militar de Japón, en una línea semejante a El arte de la guerra, escrito por el estratega chino Sun Tzu.

Sub Culture explores the crucial role of the submarine in modern history, its contribution to scientific progress and maritime exploration, and how it has been portrayed in art, literature, fantasy, and film. Ranging from the American Civil War to the destruction of the Russian submarine Kursk in 2000, the book examines the submarine's activities in the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, and in covert operations and marine exploration to the present day.

Despite great limits of money and manpower, George Washington sought to wage an aggressive war in 1779. He launched the Sullivan-Clinton campaign against Britain’s Iroquois allies in upstate New York, and in response to British attacks up the Hudson River and against coastal Connecticut, he authorized raids on British outposts at Stony Point and Paulus Hook. But given power by Congress to plan and execute operations with the French on a continental scale, Washington planned his boldest campaign.

In the dog days of August 2008, a column of Russian tanks and troops rolled across the Republic of Georgia’s northern border and into South Ossetia, sparking a war that was over almost before it began. The war, while not insignificant, lasted all of five days. The number of casualties did not exceed one thousand, the threshold most political scientists use to classify a war, although thousands of Georgians were displaced. By historical comparison, when Soviet tanks entered Hungary in 1956 and Afghanistan in 1979-89, the fatalities totaled 2,500 and roughly 14,000 respectively.

Bringing together 10 eminent Revolutionary War experts, editor Ed Lengel presents their stirring narratives of the military campaigns that changed history and gave birth to a new nation. These historians guide you through the fateful decade of the 1770s in British America. In 1776, you battle in Brooklyn Heights, then cross the Delaware with Washington. In the late summer and fall of '77, you bushwhack down the Champlain Valley with Johnny Burgoyne. You struggle through winter with Washington and his beleaguered troops in Valley Forge.

Grand Forage 1778: The Battleground Around New York City by historian Todd W. Braisted explores the battles, skirmishes, and maneuvers that left George Washington and Sir Henry Clinton playing a deadly game of chess in the lower Hudson Valley as a prelude to the British invasion of the Southern colonies.

War presents the most degraded moral environment humanity creates. Individuality is subsumed in collective violence, and humanity is obscured as a faceless, merciless enemy. A barbaric logic has guided the conduct of war throughout history. Yet as Cathal Nolan reveals in this powerful book, even as war can obliterate hope and decency at the grand level it simultaneously produces conditions that permit astonishing exceptions of mercy and shared dignity. Pulling the trigger is usually both the expedient thing and required by war's grim and remorseless calculus.

Fighting a superior foe is a momentous task. There are many ways it can be done; there are many ways victories can be achieved. In war, there are no rules, there are no laws; there are only strategies and tactics. Many say what they would do in the face of tyranny; many know what they should do when the powerful become predators. A divided people can be isolated and devoured. Survival depends upon the masses forming one mind.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States Army became the principal agent of American foreign policy. The army designed, implemented, and administered the occupations of the defeated Axis powers Germany and Japan, as well as many other nations. Generals such as Lucius Clay in Germany, Douglas MacArthur in Japan, Mark Clark in Austria, and John Hodge in Korea presided over these territories as proconsuls.

In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD's institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance - all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations.

Rethinking American Grand Strategy assembles a roster of leading historians to examine America's place in the world. Its innovative chapters reexamine familiar figures, such as John Quincy Adams, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger, while also revealing the forgotten episodes and hidden voices of American grand strategy. They expand the scope of diplomatic and military history by placing the grand strategies of public health, race, gender, humanitarianism, and the law alongside military and diplomatic affairs to reveal hidden strategists as well as strategies.

Before the cyber age, foreign interference in Western democratic politics played out in a comparatively narrow arena. The explosive expansion of cyberspace has radically altered this situation. The hacking activities of Russian military agents in the 2016 US presidential election and other major incidents demonstrate the magnitude of the contemporary problem. This is a struggle that the West is losing. Lucas Kello delves into recent history to reveal the failures of present policy in preventing and punishing cyberattacks and other forms of technological aggression.

World War II was a media war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt used the press to a great extent, of course, but as the war progressed, the media also came to influence commanders' decisions on the battlefield. The Media Offensive offers a new way to understand military-media relations during World War II. The press and public opinion shaped not only how the conflict was seen but also how it was fought. In what could be called "the new history of war reporting," the focus is switched from how the military controlled reporters to how military decisions were shaped by the press.

Strategy is a term of wide significance. It is applied to the plans, combinations, and movements in war whereby the probability of success is increased, the effect of victory enhanced and the results of defeat minimized. It embraces the art of the general in conducting operations in the theatre of war and the methods by which he seeks to bring the enemy to battle.

More than 2,000 years ago the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu advised us to know our enemies. The question has always been how. In A Sense of the Enemy, the historian Zachary Shore demonstrates that leaders can best understand an opponent not simply from his pattern of past behavior, but from his behavior at pattern breaks. Meaningful pattern breaks occur during dramatic deviations from the routine, when the enemy imposes costs upon himself. It's at these unexpected moments, Shore explains, that successful leaders can learn what makes their rivals truly tick.