Military History Strategy

When the 1st Marine Division began its invasion of Peleliu in September 1944, the operation in the South Pacific was to take but four days. In fact, capturing this small coral island in the Palaus with its strategic airstrip took two months and involved some of the bloodiest fighting of the Second World War in the Pacific.

It was 1778, and the recent American victory at Saratoga had netted the US a powerful ally in France. Many, including General George Washington, presumed France’s entrance into the war meant independence was just around the corner. Meanwhile, having lost an entire army at Saratoga, Great Britain pivoted to a 'southern strategy'. The army would henceforth seek to regain its southern colonies, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, a highly profitable segment of its prewar American empire.

In late June, 2005, media sources recounted the tragic story of 19 US special-operations personnel who died at the hands of insurgent/terrorist leader Ahmad Shah - and the lone survivor of Shah's ambush - deep in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan. The harrowing events of Operation Red Wings marked an important - yet widely misreported - chapter in the Global War on Terror, the full details of which the public burned to learn. Victory Point reveals the complete, as-yet untold story of Operation Red Wings and the follow-on mission, Operation Whalers.

Most histories of the US Army in World War II view the Mediterranean Theater of Operations primarily as a deadly training ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on the beaches of Oran, in the hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in the MTO would not have materialized without the leadership of battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops.

Perhaps the most important book on military strategy ever written, Carl von Clausewitz's On War has influenced generations of generals and politicians, has been blamed for the unprecedented death tolls, and is required reading at military academies to this day. But On War, which was never finished and was published posthumously, is obscure and fundamentally contradictory. Hew Strachan, one of the world's foremost military historians, answers these problems in this fascinating book.

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewed through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations.

Grand Forage 1778: The Battleground Around New York City by historian Todd W. Braisted explores the battles, skirmishes, and maneuvers that left George Washington and Sir Henry Clinton playing a deadly game of chess in the lower Hudson Valley as a prelude to the British invasion of the Southern colonies.

"El Arte de la Guerra" es una obra maestra atemporal que trasciende el campo de batalla y encuentra su lugar en los entornos modernos de negocios, liderazgo y desarrollo personal.

Richard Sorge was dispatched to Tokyo in 1933 to serve the spymasters of Moscow. For eight years, he masqueraded as a Nazi journalist and burrowed deep into the German embassy, digging for the secrets of Hitler's invasion of Russia and the Japanese plans for the East. In a nation obsessed with rooting out moles, he kept a high profile - boozing, womanizing, and operating entirely under his own name.

World War II changed the course of history. Douglas MacArthur changed the course of World War II. Macarthur at War goes deeper into this transformative period of his life than previous biographies, drilling into the military strategy that Walter R. Borneman is so skilled at conveying and exploring how personality and ego translate into military successes and failures.

Since 1945, the US has justified numerous wars, interventions, and military build-ups based on the pretext of the Russian Red Menace, even after the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991 and Russia stopped being Red. In fact, the two biggest post-war American conflicts, the Korean and Vietnam wars, were not, as has been frequently claimed, about stopping Soviet aggression or even influence. And now the specter of a Russian Menace has been raised again in the wake of Donald Trump's victory.

Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854-1922) was a prominent British naval historian and geostrategist whose works helped shape the Royal Navy's reforms of that era. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1918) is one of his most famous works. It covers the theory of war and the theory of naval war, and examines how England was able to prevent stronger navies from ever landing successfully or cutting supply routes between colonies in the empire. Corbett illustrates his insights with reference to the history of navies and naval battles.

In 1941, the Second World War became global, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States. In this timely book, which fills a real gap, Black engages with the strategic issues of the time - as they developed chronologically and interacted - and relates these to subsequent debates about the choices made, revealing their continued political resonances.

There are notorious figures in history who have withstood the test of time, and then there is Hannibal Barca. This man stands in a unique category of his own because the name of Hannibal Barca not only went down in history, it changed the course of it. This headstrong North African leader did the impossible. He not only led a massive army flanked by elephants - yes, elephants - from North Africa and into Europe, Hannibal also managed to check the growing superpower of Rome through sheer ingenuity.

South of the Norman city of Caen, Verrieres Ridge was seen a key stepping-stone for the British Second Army if it was to break out of the Normandy bridgehead in late July 1944. Imposing in height and containing perfect terrain for armored operations, the Germans viewed it as the lynchpin to their defenses south of the city of Caen and east of the Orne river. Following the failure of British Operation Goodwood on 18-20 July and the containment of the Canadian Operation Atlantic, further Allied attacks to seize the ridge would have to defeat the strongest German armored formation in Normandy.

Since the dawn of the Classical Era up to World War II, thousands have lost their lives fighting over the pass at Thermopylae. Historians Cole and Livingston provide an exciting account of each of the 27 battles and holding actions that took place. The Killing Ground details the background and history of each conflict, the personalities and decision making of the commanders, the arms and tactics of the troops, and how each battle played out.

In the spring of 1940, the Germans launched a military offensive in France and the Low Countries that married superb intelligence, the latest military thinking, and new technology. It was a stunning victory, altering the balance of power in Europe in one stroke, and convincing the entire world that the Nazi war machine was unstoppable. But as Lloyd Clark, a leading British military historian and academic, argues, much of our understanding of this victory, and blitzkrieg itself, is based on myth.

On War by the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is a classic of war and military strategy published in 1832. Some of the key concepts discussed in the book include: the methods of critical analysis, the uses and abuses of historical studies, the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism, the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war, the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense, strategic and operational "centers of gravity", the "culminating point of the offensive", and the "culminating point of victory".

"Shots Fired in Anger" by Lt. Col. John George is a compelling memoir and technical analysis from the front lines of the Burma campaign during World War II. Drawing upon his personal experiences, George provides an insightful narrative that offers a detailed look at the challenges and realities of combat against the Japanese forces. Not merely a collection of war stories, the book stands out for its in-depth evaluation of the small arms and weaponry used in the conflict, blending historical significance with technical expertise.

In five case studies of US Army doctrine, Campbell pits military realism against bureaucratic and cultural perspectives in three key areas - nuclear versus conventional warfare, preferences for offense versus defense, and COIN missions - and finds that the army has been more doctrinally flexible than those perspectives would predict. He demonstrates that decision makers, while vowing in the wake of Vietnam to avoid (COIN) missions, nonetheless found themselves adapting to the geopolitical realities of fighting “low intensity” conflicts.