Military History Strategy

Napoleón, Maquiavelo, Mao Tse Tung entre otros. Este libro de muchos años de antigüedad, es uno de los más importantes textos chinos, en el que, a pesar del tiempo transcurrido, ninguna de sus máximas ha quedado anticuada, ni hay un solo consejo que hoy no sea útil. Pero la obra del general Sun Tzu no es únicamente un libro de práctica militar, sino un tratado que enseña la estrategia suprema de aplicar con sabiduría el conocimiento de la naturaleza humana en los momentos de confrontación.

Exploring a critical and often neglected period of Napoleonic history between 1812 and 1814, Napoleon: The End of Glory offers a more complete picture of the Emperor's decline and fall than any previous work. Price analyzes the political, military, and diplomatic events of the period, from Napoleon's disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812 to the multiple failed attempts by Austria to broker peace. He illuminates the dynamic relationships between Napoleon and the wily Austrian foreign minister Metternich-whose desire for equilibrium within the European states system clashed with Napoleon's unshakeable belief in hegemony and subjection.

The timeless original text; required listening for anyone interested in strategy. This is a work of subtlety and paradox that shows the way to a clean and aesthetic triumph. Sun Tzu insisted that a skilled warrior observes, calculates, outwits , and outmaneuvers an adversary, and in doing so averts the destruction of battle.

Scritto nella Cina del IV secolo avanti Cristo, l’Arte della Guerra di Sun Tzu, è senza dubbio una delle più antiche raccolte di suggerimenti di tecnica militare...

The deciding battle of the War of 1812, the Battle of New Orleans, was won by the Americans on January 8, 1815, a few scant weeks after the British and American negotiators signed the Treaty of Ghent that ended the war, at least on paper. Assessed from that perspective, it might be regarded as an unnecessary battle of no importance, but nothing could be further from the truth.

For the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, war was synchronic with life. Tzu viewed the world as a network of combat zones where the stakes were high, struggle was the primary mode of being, no one was to be trusted, and survival depended on nothing less than unconditional victory. This 2,500-year-old work of wisdom continues to guide and inspire people of all cultures, teaching the principles of strategy required in everything from sports and business to affairs of the heart. Augmented by commentary and anecdotes, this audio edition maintains the pure, near-poetic tone of the original work.

Wer stark ist, wird nicht angegriffen Kriminelle Clans, Fundamentalismus, radikale Rechte stellen unsere Rechtsordnung in Frage. Autoritäre Regierungen unterhöhlen die EU, Russland und China gefährden die westlichen Demokratien und den globalen Frieden. Im Äußeren wie im Inneren steht Deutschland unter Druck. Wenn wir bewahren wollen, was uns kostbar ist, müssen wir uns rüsten. Dabei ist es längst nicht ausreichend, die Bundeswehr zu ertüchtigen.

War presents the most degraded moral environment humanity creates. Individuality is subsumed in collective violence, and humanity is obscured as a faceless, merciless enemy. A barbaric logic has guided the conduct of war throughout history. Yet as Cathal Nolan reveals in this powerful book, even as war can obliterate hope and decency at the grand level it simultaneously produces conditions that permit astonishing exceptions of mercy and shared dignity. Pulling the trigger is usually both the expedient thing and required by war's grim and remorseless calculus.

Strategy is a term of wide significance. It is applied to the plans, combinations, and movements in war whereby the probability of success is increased, the effect of victory enhanced and the results of defeat minimized. It embraces the art of the general in conducting operations in the theatre of war and the methods by which he seeks to bring the enemy to battle.

Why do military commanders fail at crucial moments of their careers? Robert Pois and Philip Langer, one a historian, the other an educational psychologist, study seven cases of military command failures, from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Hitler’s invasion of Russia. While the authors recognize the value of psychological theorizing, they do not believe that one method can cover all the individuals, battles, or campaigns under examination. Instead, they judiciously take a number of psycho-historical approaches in hope of shedding light on the behaviors of commanders during war.

Military commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of "operational art", the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff employ in designing, synchronizing, and conducting battles and major operations to achieve strategic goals. He shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, US war colleges educated and trained commanders during the interwar years specifically for the operational art they employed in World War II.

When the 1st Marine Division began its invasion of Peleliu in September 1944, the operation in the South Pacific was to take but four days. In fact, capturing this small coral island in the Palaus with its strategic airstrip took two months and involved some of the bloodiest fighting of the Second World War in the Pacific.

Less than a month after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US Army formed its first air force designated to operate overseas, the Eighth. Within four months they had set up base in England. Three months later they were bombing German targets in occupied Europe. The Eighth was the first bomber command on either side to commit to strategic daylight bombing. It was a major change in tactics - and the men of the Eighth paid the price in both lives and blood.

Estes describes the mobilization, organization, and operations of First Brigade during the first three months of American participation in the Korean War. Focusing on the battalions, companies, and platoons that faced the hardened soldiers of the North Korean army, he brings the listener directly to the battlefield. The story he reveals there, woven with the voices of soldiers and officers, is one of cooperation rather than interservice rivalry. At the same time, he clarifies differences in the organizational cultures of the US Army and the Marine Corps.

In June 1944, the attention of the nation was riveted on the events unfolding in France. But in the Pacific, the Battle of Saipan was of extreme strategic importance. D-Day in the Pacific: The Battle of Saipan is a gripping account of one of the most dramatic engagements of World War II. The conquest of Saipan and the neighboring island of Tinian was a turning point in the war in the Pacific, making the American victory against Japan inevitable.

In the early 1970s, as US combat forces began to withdraw from Southeast Asia, South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces continued the fight against the People's Army of Vietnam and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, more commonly known as the Viet Cong. Despite the evacuation of its ground troops, the United States promised to materially support its allies' struggle against communist aggression.

Weapons improved rapidly after the Civil War, raising difficult questions about the battle tactics employed by the United States Army. The most fundamental problem was the dominance of the tactical defensive, when defenders protected by fieldworks could deliver deadly fire from rifles and artillery against attackers advancing in close-ordered lines.

On May 25, 1863, after driving the Confederate army into defensive lines surrounding Vicksburg, Mississippi, Union major general Ulysses S. Grant and his Army of the Tennessee laid siege to the fortress city. With no reinforcements and dwindling supplies, the Army of Vicksburg finally surrendered on July 4, yielding command of the Mississippi River to Union forces and effectively severing the Confederacy.

No previously published work examines General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s role in depth during the Pacific War of 1944-1945, in the context of planning for the destruction of Japan. In this new study, Herman S. Wolk, retired Senior Historian of the U.S. Air Force, examines the thinking of Hap Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces (AAF), during World War II. Specifically, Wolk concentrates on Arnold’s leadership in crafting the weapons, organization, and command of the strategic bombing offensive against Japan, which culminated in Japan’s capitulation in the summer of 1945, ending the Pacific War.

While their husbands, brothers and sweethearts fought in Europe and their mothers, sisters and friends kept the home fires burning, for the first time, a group of remarkable women took to the skies. They weren't allowed into combat but risked their lives in bad weather and without radios to bring our boys the aircraft they so vitally needed. Employed by the Air Transport Auxiliary, these women were known as 'attagirls'. They proved that women, too, could master Spitfires, Mosquitoes and Hawker Hurricanes, forging a new path in aviation.